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来源类型 | Report |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA674-1 |
来源ID | RR-A674-1 |
Engaging with North Korea: Lessons from Game Theory | |
Troy D. Smith; Marco Hafner; Bruce W. Bennett | |
发表日期 | 2021-08-12 |
出版年 | 2021 |
页码 | 20 |
语种 | 英语 |
结论 | The stakes of negotiations for nuclear disarmament on the Korean peninsula are very high
Even if neither side cheats, one or more players could decide to walk away from a future agreement
The best courses of action might be very different if North Korea and the United States are the only two players negotiating nuclear disarmament or if there are other countries involved
The existing negotiations between the United States and North Korea just might be the latest stage in a complex repeated game between the two countries
The payoffs for the current game with North Korea might extend beyond economic gain and loss and even beyond the potential loss of life
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摘要 | It can be useful to rethink a difficult problem by applying a new lens and seeing whether that lens provides new strategies and either reinforces or calls into question existing ones. A change of leadership in Washington provides an opportunity to once again reevaluate the relationship between the United States and North Korea, and to figure out ways to productively move forward. In this report, the authors draw on intuition from game theory to better understand the situation in North Korea. These insights and recommendations are based on game theoretic analysis of how to deal with Kim Jong-un, the leader of North Korea, and the situation on the Korean peninsula; specifically, how to carry out negotiations on denuclearization. ,The authors argue that U.S. policy should make better use of concrete actions that are designed to elucidate Kim's ultimate goals and motivations. Much more emphasis at the beginning of negotiations should be placed on designing effective monitoring and verification mechanisms, figuring out a way to ensure credible commitment on both sides, and determining the long-term effects of any action on future negotiations and other countries. ,Strong multilateral cooperation, especially with China, is the best way to deal with North Korea; the incentives of North Korean elites have not been discussed enough in the existing literature. Deadlines to spur progress—and consequences if those deadlines are not met—are vitally important because, with each passing year, North Korea's technological prowess and stockpile of nuclear weapons are likely increasing. |
目录 |
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主题 | Game Theory ; North Korea ; Nuclear Deterrence ; United States |
URL | https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA674-1.html |
来源智库 | RAND Corporation (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/524527 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Troy D. Smith,Marco Hafner,Bruce W. Bennett. Engaging with North Korea: Lessons from Game Theory. 2021. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
RAND_RRA674-1.pdf(229KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
x1628771200891.jpg.p(4KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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