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The stakes of negotiations for nuclear disarmament on the Korean peninsula are very high

• The authors hypothesize two potential scenarios: one in which Kim Jong-un's highest goal is to preserve his position and prevent regime change, and another in which his highest goal is to rule over both North and South Korea.

Even if neither side cheats, one or more players could decide to walk away from a future agreement

• North Korea has made three previous agreements on nuclear weapons and has not abided by any of the agreements.
• North Korea, China, and other players might also have a hard time believing that the United States will abide by its agreements.

The best courses of action might be very different if North Korea and the United States are the only two players negotiating nuclear disarmament or if there are other countries involved

• Either the United States or North Korea might try to strategically alter the number of effective players in the game to tilt the situation toward their preferred outcomes.

The existing negotiations between the United States and North Korea just might be the latest stage in a complex repeated game between the two countries

• Strategies and tactics that are used could set precedents for future interactions, and negotiators must keep this in mind.

The payoffs for the current game with North Korea might extend beyond economic gain and loss and even beyond the potential loss of life

• If winning in this context means that the other party must be seen to lose, then both parties might view any potential negotiations as zero-sum—if North Korea obtains what is perceived as a favorable outcome, then the United States loses, and vice versa.

It can be useful to rethink a difficult problem by applying a new lens and seeing whether that lens provides new strategies and either reinforces or calls into question existing ones. A change of leadership in Washington provides an opportunity to once again reevaluate the relationship between the United States and North Korea, and to figure out ways to productively move forward. In this report, the authors draw on intuition from game theory to better understand the situation in North Korea. These insights and recommendations are based on game theoretic analysis of how to deal with Kim Jong-un, the leader of North Korea, and the situation on the Korean peninsula; specifically, how to carry out negotiations on denuclearization.

The authors argue that U.S. policy should make better use of concrete actions that are designed to elucidate Kim's ultimate goals and motivations. Much more emphasis at the beginning of negotiations should be placed on designing effective monitoring and verification mechanisms, figuring out a way to ensure credible commitment on both sides, and determining the long-term effects of any action on future negotiations and other countries.

Strong multilateral cooperation, especially with China, is the best way to deal with North Korea; the incentives of North Korean elites have not been discussed enough in the existing literature. Deadlines to spur progress—and consequences if those deadlines are not met—are vitally important because, with each passing year, North Korea's technological prowess and stockpile of nuclear weapons are likely increasing.

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