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U.S. strategic guidance for LAC has gaps with regard transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and great-power competition (GPC)

• TCOs are becoming more prevalent in LAC, but how they threaten U.S. interests and how efforts against them should be prioritized have not yet been definitively articulated in national strategy.
• TCOs tie into GPC concerns because they provide global adversaries with a conduit for contesting U.S. national security interests in the region — but this point is often ignored in discussions of GPC strategy and the allocation of resources.

China's efforts to gain influence in LAC are much more comprehensive than Russia's or Iran's

• Russia and Iran are very opportunistic and highly dependent on political contingencies (e.g., anti-U.S. governments assuming power) and on illicit networks and ungoverned spaces.
• China is implementing comprehensive, large-scale, and multidomain (diplomatic, economic, military, cultural) global plans that include LAC as an increasingly important component. China emphasizes relationship-building at all levels, which gains it access and influence in the short term while also promoting lasting long-term investment.

U.S. resourcing to national security objectives in LAC should be further improved

• Recent changes made to Title 10 security cooperation authorities have improved interagency coordination efforts.
• Sustaining regular engagement with partner nations is a persistent concern for U.S. officials in LAC, and there may be opportunities to find ways to increase and routinize such efforts in the region.
• The size and perhaps the composition of the NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM staffs appear insufficient to sustain the level of partner-nation engagement necessary to compete in a GPC context.

Despite being in the United States' "neighborhood," Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has typically not been a priority region for U.S. national security objectives, and in recent decades threats emanating from the region have largely been perceived to be tied to narcotics and other illicit trafficking. This posture may need to be reassessed, especially in light of the increased activities and investments made in the region by adversaries in the context of great-power competition.

In this report, the authors assess the sufficiency of resources available to pursue U.S. national security objectives in LAC, drawing on strategic guidance documents issued at the national and departmental levels, as well as by U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs at the U.S. State Department, and the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The authors also provide an in-depth review of the goals and objectives of China, Russia, and Iran in the region and the ways in which each adversary is pursuing them.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  Western Hemisphere Considerations and U.S. National Security Interests

• Chapter Three

  Gauging the Threat: U.S. Adversaries in the Western Hemisphere

• Chapter Four

  Resourcing for U.S. National Security Interests in the Western Hemisphere

• Chapter Five

  Conclusion: Assessing U.S. National Security Resourcing Requirements in Latin America and the Caribbean

• Appendix A

  Pertinent Language of Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 1265

• Appendix B

  Chinese Economic Programs in the Western Hemisphere

• Appendix C

  Example of SOUTHCOM Enterprise Funding Budget Slide

• Appendix D

  Other U.S. Agencies with Complementary Programs Supporting National Security in the Western Hemisphere

• Appendix E

  DoD Limitations in Conducting Security Cooperation with Nations Classified as High Income

• Appendix F

  Bi-/Multinational Training and Exercise Missions Carried Out by SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM

• Appendix G

  References for Figures 3.4 and 3.12–3.14