| 来源类型 | Report |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| Independent and Accountable: A New Mandate for the Bank of England | |
| David Begg; Terence C. Daintith; Leonhard Gleske; Charles Goodhart; Philippe Lagayette; Peter Middleton; Mario Monti; Richard Portes; Eric Roll; David Walker; Charles Wyplosz | |
| 发表日期 | 1993-11-01 |
| 出版年 | 1993 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This report is of a panel of experts, chaired by Eric Roll, which examined proposals for changing the Bank of England�s mandate and its relationship with the Treasury. It comes out strongly in favour of a central bank free to set monetary policy; pursuing only price stability without Treasury control. Taking independence measures enacted since 1993 to their logical conclusion, it argues for the following: (1) Price stability to be the sole statutory objective of the Bank, which formulates and announces a medium-term target for inflation and controls short-term interest rates to achieve it. (2) The Bank has full control of interest rates. Given interest rates, foreign exchange markets then determine the exchange rate. (3) Increased democratic accountability through clear criteria to judge policy and through reporting mechanisms. (4) Ministerial power to override the Bank�s objective, subject to Parliamentary approval. (5) To safeguard monetary policy independence, the Bank ceases to be banker to the government. Written at a time when withdrawal from the ERM had left the UK without a credible monetary policy anchor, the panel�s recommendations offered a timely solution. Subsequent events - from the decision in early 1994 to publish the minutes of the meetings of the Chancellor and Governor to the announcement by the new Labour government of a framework for the Bank�s independence - have both benefited from and justified their deliberations. Whether the politicians will go as far as the Report recommends remains to be seen. This report offers a concise and pertinent analysis of the issues surrounding central bank independence, with strong implications for the current proposed legislation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/books-and-reports/independent-and-accountable-new-mandate-bank-england |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529033 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David Begg,Terence C. Daintith,Leonhard Gleske,et al. Independent and Accountable: A New Mandate for the Bank of England. 1993. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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