| 来源类型 | Report |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| MEI 12 Built to Last: A Political Architecture for Europe | |
| Erik Berglöf; Barry Eichengreen; Gerard Roland; Guido Tabellini; Charles Wyplosz | |
| 发表日期 | 2003-02-26 |
| 出处 | Monitoring European Integration |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The European Constitutional Convention offers a historical opportunity to rethink and to improve the governance and organization of the European Union. At stake is Europe?s political architecture: the form that government takes and the allocation of responsibilities between the member states and supranational bodies. Many reform proposals have already been offered to the Convention. This Report provides a method for evaluating those options, developing an analytical framework derived from recent developments in the theory of positive political economy. On this basis the authors conclude that a presidential system of governance is likely to be best adapted to Europe ? and specifically to the need to expand the competency of the EU in the areas of internal and external security (Europe?s Second and Third Pillars). In a full-blown presidential system, the Commission would have well-defined executive powers, specified by the Council, and a president elected by the citizens of Europe. The European executive would be subject to checks and balances by both the Council and the European Parliament. But political realism excludes adopting such a solution in the short run. The authors therefore propose an evolutionary strategy: the election of the Commission president by a college of country representatives appointed in the short run by national parliaments, leaving the option open to individual countries to allocate their votes for the presidency via universal suffrage . This solution would preserve the option of moving to a fully-fledged presidential model sometime in the future, while providing enhanced democratic legitimacy from the start. In general, the Constitution should be long on principles and general rules and short on details so as to allow Europe?s governance to evolve within an unchanged Constitution. |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/books-and-reports/mei-12-built-last-political-architecture-europe |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529081 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Erik Berglöf,Barry Eichengreen,Gerard Roland,et al. MEI 12 Built to Last: A Political Architecture for Europe. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| 70217-mei_12_built_t（555KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| Book - 41.jpeg（6KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA |  浏览 | ||
| 文件名： | Book - 41.jpeg |
| 格式： | JPEG |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
