| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP27 |
| DP27 Dynamic Games and the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in Open Economies | |
| Mark Salmon; Marcus Miller | |
| 发表日期 | 1984-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 1984 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper the Maximum Principle is used to derive optimal policies for linear-quadratic, continuous-time economic systems where there may be more than one policy-maker and where the private sector may have rational expectations. The analogy between solving full-information differential games and designing policy in the presence of forward-looking expectations is explored first, before these two problems are considered in combination. Both the "term inconsistent" optimal policy which arises from strategic asymmetries, and various time consistent alternatives are discussed; and the approach is illustrated with an application to fiscal stabilisation policy in a Common Market. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Continuous-time economic system Fiscal stabilization Full-information differential games Maximum principle |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp27 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529183 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mark Salmon,Marcus Miller. DP27 Dynamic Games and the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in Open Economies. 1984. |
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