| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP63 |
| DP63 Credibility and Commitment in Economic Policy | |
| John Driffill; David Backus | |
| 发表日期 | 1985-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 1985 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Dynamic inconsistency provides a theoretical basis for discussions of policy credibility: when the government cannot commit its future policies, the incentive to deviate from the 'optimal' plan renders it incredible. We derive the best policy in the absence of precommitment as the feedback Nash solution to a dynamic game between the government and a private sector composed of small agents. The solution is dynamically consistent by construction, and therefore credible. An application to disinflation shows that the feedback Nash policy may be considerably more costly than the 'optimal', but inconsistent policy. The analysis also reveals the source of the inconsistency of benevolent governments' policies. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Atomistic agents Disinflation Dynamic consistency Feedback solution Policy credibility Rational expectations |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp63 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529220 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John Driffill,David Backus. DP63 Credibility and Commitment in Economic Policy. 1985. |
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