| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP70 |
| DP70 The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration | |
| Oliver Hart | |
| 发表日期 | 1985-07-01 |
| 出版年 | 1985 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | What determines how integrated a firm is? We emphasize the benefits of "control" when there are difficulties in writing complete contracts. We define the firm as being composed of its assets. We present a theory of costly contracts which emphasizes that contractual rights can be of two types: specific rights and residual rights. When it is too costly to list all specific rights over assets in the contract, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights. Ownership is the purchase of these residual rights. We show that there can be costs associated with the wrong allocation of residual rights. |
| 关键词 | Contracts Horizontal integration Theory of the firm Vertical integration |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp70 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529225 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Oliver Hart. DP70 The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. 1985. |
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