G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP102
DP102 The Sustainability of Optimal Cooperative Macroeconomic Policies in a Two-Country World
Jane Rapson; Paul Levine
发表日期1986-04-01
出版年1986
语种英语
摘要The paper investigates the sustainability of cooperative rules for the conduct of macroeconomic policy in a two-country world. The problem is set out as a supergame in which the threat strategy is to switch to a Nash non-cooperative equilibrium. A number of possible non-cooperative equilibria are reviewed, and two are analysed in detail as possible threat strategies. The first is an open-loop Nash equilibrium where the government is able to precommit itself to the policies it announces. This policy is time inconsistent so we discuss an alternative threat, a time-consistent closed-loop Nash equilibrium. Similarly time inconsistent and time consistent forms of cooperative equilibria are examined. We apply these solution concepts to a small two-country model with in which we impose parameter values. We discover that the presence of stochastic disturbances in the model enables the fully optimal (and time-inconsistent) cooperative policy to be sustainable. The optimal policy is sustainable not only when both governments can renege on the policies they announce to the private sector, and a reneging of one, but also when one government reneges on the other.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Cooperative rules Macroeconomic policy Nash equilibrium Reputation Sustainability Time consistency
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp102
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529258
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jane Rapson,Paul Levine. DP102 The Sustainability of Optimal Cooperative Macroeconomic Policies in a Two-Country World. 1986.
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