G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP124
DP124 The Consistency of Optimal Policy in Stochastic Rational Expectations Models
John Driffill; David Backus
发表日期1986-08-01
出版年1986
语种英语
摘要This paper extends the work of Barro and Gordon (1983) to general linear models with rational expectations. We examine the question whether the optimal policy rule, i.e. the one that a government which could pre-commit itself would use, can be sustained as a consistent rule in the sense defined by Kydland and Prescott (1977) if the reputational effects similar to those described by Barro and Gordon operate. The analysis is carried out in the context of an infinite horizon game between the government and private sector agents in the economy. We are able to show that, providing the support of the distribution of shocks hitting the economy is bounded, and providing the discount rate in the government objective function is low enough, the optimal policy rule can be sustained as a consistent policy in general. We obtain solutions for the optimal policy rule and the consistent policy rule using straightforward recursive methods and dynamic programming, and show that control theory can be made applicable to economic planning even when expectations are rational (pace Kydland and Prescott, 1977).
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Credibility Macroeconomic policy Optimality Rational expectations Subgame perfect equilibrium Time consistency
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp124
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529280
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
John Driffill,David Backus. DP124 The Consistency of Optimal Policy in Stochastic Rational Expectations Models. 1986.
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