| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP235 |
| DP235 International Monetary Cooperation under Tariff Threats | |
| Flavio Delbono; Giorgio Basevi; Vincenzo Denicolò | |
| 发表日期 | 1988-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 1988 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyse games between two countries which use the threat of imposing a tariff to induce each other to follow monetary policies equivalent to those that would obtain under a cooperative game. The analysis shows that -- under certain assumptions concerning the shares of tariff revenues, what the countries spend on imports, the punishment structures and the discount factors -- the outcome of the game converges to the equivalent of the cooperative equilibrium, with zero tariffs and optimal monetary policies. It is suggested that the model could be applied to current relations between the US, Germany and Japan. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics ; International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | monetary policy Tariffs Threat and punishment strategies |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp235 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529390 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Flavio Delbono,Giorgio Basevi,Vincenzo Denicolò. DP235 International Monetary Cooperation under Tariff Threats. 1988. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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