| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP251 |
| DP251 Decentralised Policies and Efficient Trade-Offs: An Essay on the Costs of Uncoordinated Fiscal and Monetary Policies | |
| Andrew Hughes Hallett; Maria Luisa Petit | |
| 发表日期 | 1988-07-01 |
| 出版年 | 1988 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In many countries two decision-making institutions, the government and the central bank, manage fiscal and monetary policy separately. Such decentralization can lead to a change in the optimal inflation-output trade-off. In fact lack of cooperation can result in a change in the position of the trade-off curve, or a reversal in the slope of this trade-off, or even the total absence of any exploitable trade-off. In this paper the techniques of differential game theory are used to calculate the efficient inflation-output trade-off within a continuous-time econometric model of the Italian economy, in order to examine the differences in the 'policy possibility frontiers' which arise as the result of cooperative and of noncooperative decision-making. The results show that the outcomes obtained in the case of noncooperation are inferior to those under cooperation, and also impose a policy conflict which would not otherwise be present. Moreover the range of policy choices open to the policy-makers is reduced under noncooperation. The results indicate that efficiency gains are not the only reason for coordinating fiscal and monetary policies. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Agency coordination Continuous time models Differential games Fiscal policy Italy monetary policy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp251 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529408 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Hughes Hallett,Maria Luisa Petit. DP251 Decentralised Policies and Efficient Trade-Offs: An Essay on the Costs of Uncoordinated Fiscal and Monetary Policies. 1988. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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