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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP253 |
DP253 External Debt, Capital Flight and Political Risk | |
Guido Tabellini; Alberto Alesina | |
发表日期 | 1988-08-01 |
出版年 | 1988 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper provides an explanation of the simultaneous occurrence in developing countries of a large accumulation of external debt, private capital outflows and relatively low domestic capital formation. We consider a general equilibrium model in which two types of government with conflicting distributional goals randomly alternate in office. Uncertainty over the fiscal policies of future governments generates private capital flight and reduced domestic investment. This political uncertainty also provides the incentives for the current government to over-accumulate external debt. The model also predicts that left-wing governments are more inclined to impose restrictions on capital outflows than right-wing governments. Finally, we examine how political uncertainty affects the risk premium charged by lenders and how debt repudiation may occur after a change of political regime. |
主题 | International Macroeconomics |
关键词 | Capital controls Capital flight Debt repudiation Developing countries External debt Fiscal policy Political economy |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp253 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529414 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guido Tabellini,Alberto Alesina. DP253 External Debt, Capital Flight and Political Risk. 1988. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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