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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP258 |
DP258 Can International Policy Coordination Really Be Counterproductive? | |
Francesco Giavazzi; Carlo Carraro | |
发表日期 | 1988-08-01 |
出版年 | 1988 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper shows that international policy coordination is not counterproductive in a world where the incentive to run beggar-thy-neighbor policies internationally arises from the inefficiency that characterizes, within each country, the interaction between policymakers and private agents. The domestic inefficiency arises from the presence of nominal contracts that give central banks the power to affect real variables. In this setting we show that international cooperation belongs to the central banks' dominant strategy. The paper is motivated by a common and misleading interpretation of a paper by Rogolf `1985(, namely that international cooperation may be counterproductive in the presence of a domestic inefficiency. |
主题 | International Macroeconomics |
关键词 | Institutions International cooperation monetary policy Sequential games |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp258 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529418 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francesco Giavazzi,Carlo Carraro. DP258 Can International Policy Coordination Really Be Counterproductive?. 1988. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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