| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP269 |
| DP269 Voting on the Budget Deficit | |
| Guido Tabellini; Alberto Alesina | |
| 发表日期 | 1988-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 1988 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes a model in which different rational individuals vote over the composition and time profile of public spending. Potential disagreement between current and future majorities generates instability in the social choice function that aggregates individual preferences. In equilibrium a majority of the voters may favor a budget deficit. The size of the deficit under majority rule tends to be larger, the greater is the polarization between current and potential future majorities. The paper also shows that the ex ante efficient equilibrium of this model involves a balanced budget. A balanced budget amendment, however, is not durable under majority rule. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Balanced budget Budget deficit Government spending Majority rule Political parties Social choice |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp269 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529425 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guido Tabellini,Alberto Alesina. DP269 Voting on the Budget Deficit. 1988. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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