| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP277 |
| DP277 International Capacity Choice and National Market Games | |
| Anthony Venables | |
| 发表日期 | 1988-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 1988 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A series of models are developed in which international trade is modelled as a two-stage game between firms in two countries. At the first stage firms choose their productive capacity. At the second stage different types of market game are played. The most interesting case is that in which firms play a separate price game in each national market, given their worldwide capacity levels. It is established that (i) firms use capacity strategically, in order to manipulate the distribution of rivals' output between markets; (ii) the volume of intra-industry trade is intermediate between the two cases most extensively studied in the trade literature (integrated- and segmented-market Cournot equilibria); and (iii) countries gain from small import tariffs and export subsidies, but these gains are less than in the case of segmented markets and a Cournot equilibrium. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Cournot equilibrium Economic capacity International trade Market structure Oligopoly |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp277 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529432 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anthony Venables. DP277 International Capacity Choice and National Market Games. 1988. |
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