| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP289 |
| DP289 A Democratic Model of the `Rent-Sought' Benefit Cycle | |
| Michael Beenstock | |
| 发表日期 | 1989-04-01 |
| 出版年 | 1989 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Lobby groups press for various administrative concessions which are granted at the expense of the rest of society. This paper tries to explain why sometimes the rest of society does not prevent the lobbies from exploiting them while at other times it protests against the injustice. It also suggests why after a while the public may demand a reform in which the concessions are abolished. The basic analytical insight is that there may be an externality to successful lobbying; when one group succeeds this establishes a precedent that makes it easier for other groups to succeed. The chain reaction that is thus triggered may be to the advantage of a majority of the electorate. |
| 关键词 | Democracy Externalitics Lobby groups Majority voting Political economy Public choice |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp289 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529452 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Beenstock. DP289 A Democratic Model of the `Rent-Sought' Benefit Cycle. 1989. |
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