| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP336 |
| DP336 Winners and Losers from Anti-Merger Laws | |
| Konstantine Gatsios; Larry Karp | |
| 发表日期 | 1989-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 1989 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a model in which, in the absence of anti-merger laws, a merger that includes all non-competitive firms always occurs. The merger, however, can only occur (in the absence of laws which prohibit it) after the firms are formed, which in the present context means after investment has occurred. The investment decision is always undertaken non-cooperatively but with the rational anticipation of whether or nor a merger will subsequently occur. The anticipation of a merger alters the incentives for investment. The anticipated merger may increase the equilibrium level of investment to such an extent that net profits are lower than when a merger is prohibited. As a result the monopoly price may be less than the oligopoly price, and anti-merger laws may harm consumers and benefit producers. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Disadvantageous cartels Investment games Mergers |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp336 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529490 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Konstantine Gatsios,Larry Karp. DP336 Winners and Losers from Anti-Merger Laws. 1989. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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