| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP337 |
| DP337 Delegation Games in Customs Unions | |
| Konstantine Gatsios; Larry Karp | |
| 发表日期 | 1989-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 1989 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a model in which a customs union trades with countries that behaved strategically. If the members of the customs union are similar but not identical, one country will want to delegate authority for making union policy to its partner. Even if side-payments within the union are permitted, union welfare may be higher if one country chooses union policy to maximize its own welfare, rather than having a supra-national agent choosing union policy to maximize joint welfare. The delegation decision depends on whether the policies used by union and non-union countries are strategic substitutes or complements and on which union member is more "aggressive". |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Customs union Trade policy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp337 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529496 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Konstantine Gatsios,Larry Karp. DP337 Delegation Games in Customs Unions. 1989. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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