| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP381 |
| DP381 Seigniorage and Political Stabiliity | |
| Sebastian Edwards; Alex Cukierman; Guido Tabellini | |
| 发表日期 | 1990-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 1990 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries. The main theoretical implication of this paper is that countries with more unstable and polarized political systems rely more heavily on seigniorage. This result is obtained within the context of a political model of tax reform. The model implies that the more unstable and polarized the political system, the more inefficient is the equilibrium tax structure (in the sense that tax collection is more costly to administer), and the higher therefore the reliance on seigniorage. This prediction of the model is tested on cross-section data for 79 countries. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Government revenue Political systems Seigniorage Tax reform |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp381 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529536 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sebastian Edwards,Alex Cukierman,Guido Tabellini. DP381 Seigniorage and Political Stabiliity. 1990. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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