| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP387 |
| DP387 The US-Japan Semiconductor Agreement | |
| Richard Baldwin | |
| 发表日期 | 1990-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 1990 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The semiconductor arrangement was intended to enhance free trade based on market principles. This paper argues that the arrangement had exactly the opposite effect. The arrangement has two parts: a price floor to prevent predatory pricing, and provisions to double U.S. market share in Japan to counter market closure. Given semiconductor production technology, the price floor forced a capacity reduction, a rise in world prices and a cartelization of the market. Since the observed dumping was probably not predatory pricing, the price floor restricted competition and free trade. The market closure probably exists and significantly harms non-Japanese producers. It is therefore an anti-competitive practice. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Commercial policy Semiconductor industry Trade agreements Trade restrictions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp387 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529542 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Richard Baldwin. DP387 The US-Japan Semiconductor Agreement. 1990. |
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