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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP409 |
DP409 Credibility, Ambiguity and Asymmetric Information with Wage/Price Stickiness | |
Paul Levine; Joseph Pearlman | |
发表日期 | 1990-04-01 |
出版年 | 1990 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | The effect of asymmetric information on monetary policy is investigated in the context of an overlapping wage contract model. Optimal rules with and without precommitment under full information are compared with the optimal rule without precommitment (i.e. the discretionary rule) under asymmetric information. The results extend those of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) to a dynamic model with a short-run output/inflation trade-off. The optimal discretionary rate is less than that under full information and there is also a role for ambiguity in the setting of monetary policy. Both these effects of asymmetric information diminish as the average length of wage contracts increases. |
主题 | International Macroeconomics |
关键词 | Ambiguity Asymmetric information Credibility Time consistency Wages and prices |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp409 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529564 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paul Levine,Joseph Pearlman. DP409 Credibility, Ambiguity and Asymmetric Information with Wage/Price Stickiness. 1990. |
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