G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP409
DP409 Credibility, Ambiguity and Asymmetric Information with Wage/Price Stickiness
Paul Levine; Joseph Pearlman
发表日期1990-04-01
出版年1990
语种英语
摘要The effect of asymmetric information on monetary policy is investigated in the context of an overlapping wage contract model. Optimal rules with and without precommitment under full information are compared with the optimal rule without precommitment (i.e. the discretionary rule) under asymmetric information. The results extend those of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) to a dynamic model with a short-run output/inflation trade-off. The optimal discretionary rate is less than that under full information and there is also a role for ambiguity in the setting of monetary policy. Both these effects of asymmetric information diminish as the average length of wage contracts increases.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Ambiguity Asymmetric information Credibility Time consistency Wages and prices
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp409
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529564
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Paul Levine,Joseph Pearlman. DP409 Credibility, Ambiguity and Asymmetric Information with Wage/Price Stickiness. 1990.
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