| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP462
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| DP462 `Secret' Buy-backs of LDC Debt |
| Daniel Cohen; Thierry Verdier
|
| 发表日期 | 1990-09-01
|
| 出版年 | 1990
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We analyse the buy-back of its debt by an LDC. Contrary to the analyses that were previously done on this subject, we assume that the debtor can hide its transactions behind the veil of a fictitious operator: the banks, we assume, cannot discriminate intra-bank transactions from buy-backs by the debtor itself. With this assumption, the lenders set the price by (rationally) taking account of the country's incentive to repurchase its debt. Will the debtor undertake a buy-back of its debt? The answer is a qualified yes. Large buy-backs will take place. With a continuum of debtors (whose cash constraints are not perfectly known to the banks), the rich debtors will attempt to repurchase as much of their debt as their cash constraint allows them to. This is shown to be Pareto-improving for both the banks and the debtor country. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics
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| 关键词 | Buy-backs
Ldc debt
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp462
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| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529617
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Daniel Cohen,Thierry Verdier. DP462 `Secret' Buy-backs of LDC Debt. 1990.
|
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