| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP538 |
| DP538 The Virtues of Gradualism and Legitimacy in the Transition to a Market Economy | |
| Mathias Dewatripont; Gerard Roland | |
| 发表日期 | 1991-04-01 |
| 出版年 | 1991 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents a simplified model of sectoral restructuring in Eastern Europe. A move towards allocative efficiency is desired by the reform-minded government, but the shift to higher productivity which such efficiency requires would lead to massive layoffs and labour reallocation in the transition period. We look at the impact of political constraints (unanimity and/or majority worker approval) on reform proposals when the government faces a heterogeneous workforce, holding private information on relative outside opportunities. When the budgetary consequences of exit compensations are so important as to make partial reforms preferable to full reforms, gradualism emerges as the optimum in a dynamic context without government commitment. It is also shown that under democratic majority rule, a government in control of the agenda of reforms can win majority approval for plans which end up hurting majority interests intertemporally by threatening to switch majorities in future reform proposals. |
| 关键词 | Political constraints Sectoral restructuring Transition |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp538 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529691 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mathias Dewatripont,Gerard Roland. DP538 The Virtues of Gradualism and Legitimacy in the Transition to a Market Economy. 1991. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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