| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP560 |
| DP560 Cost Asymmetries in International Subsidy Games: Should Governments Help Winners or Losers? | |
| Peter Neary | |
| 发表日期 | 1991-07-01 |
| 出版年 | 1991 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines the optimality of export subsidies in oligopolistic markets, when home and foreign firms have different costs and there is an opportunity cost to public funds. Subsidies are found to be optimal only for surprisingly low values of the shadow price of government funds, and if subsidies are justified they should be higher the more cost-competitive are domestic firms. These results hold under both Cournot competition and Bertrand competition when firms move before governments. The results suggest that recent arguments for export subsidies apply only for firms that would be highly profitable even without subsidies. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Cournot/bertrand competition Export subsidies Industrial policy Strategic trade policy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp560 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529718 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Peter Neary. DP560 Cost Asymmetries in International Subsidy Games: Should Governments Help Winners or Losers?. 1991. |
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