| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP582
|
| DP582 External Debt and Political Instability |
| Guido Tabellini; Sule Ozler
|
| 发表日期 | 1991-10-01
|
| 出版年 | 1991
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the role played by domestic political incentives in the accumulation of large external debts by developing countries between 1972 and 1981. The theoretical model characterizes two equilibrium regimes. In one the borrower is on its demand curve and changes in the loan size desired by the borrower are accommodated by lenders. In the other regime the borrower is credit rationed, and the loan size is determined by the perceived country risk. Increased political instability increases the equilibrium loan size in the first regime and decreases it in the second. Using out-of-sample evidence, we identify the two regimes in the data. We then find that in the unconstrained regime political instability has a significant effect on the loan size, whereas it has no significant effect in the credit rationing regime. Hence the evidence indicates a positive effect of political instability on the demand for sovereign loans, as predicted by the theory. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics
|
| 关键词 | Developing countries
External debt
investment
Politics
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp582
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529744
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Guido Tabellini,Sule Ozler. DP582 External Debt and Political Instability. 1991.
|
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