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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP637 |
DP637 Biased Contests and Moral Hazard: Implications for Career Profiles | |
Margaret Meyer | |
发表日期 | 1992-02-29 |
出版年 | 1992 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study the design of a sequence of two contests between a pair of identical risk averse employees whose effort choices are private information. It is optimal for the organization to `bias' the second contest in favor of the early winner - the reduction in second-period incentives is outweighed by the increase in first-period incentives. Thus, even though first-period success reflects only transitory shocks and not ability, it is efficient to structure the contests so these shocks have persistent effects on employees' careers. |
关键词 | Bias Career profiles Contests Moral hazard Organizations |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp637 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529787 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Margaret Meyer. DP637 Biased Contests and Moral Hazard: Implications for Career Profiles. 1992. |
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