| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP639
|
| DP639 Fiscal Policy Coordination and EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach |
| Paul Levine; Andrew Brociner
|
| 发表日期 | 1992-05-29
|
| 出版年 | 1992
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper considers fiscal policy coordination in a European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). We use an overlapping generations model which leads to departures from Barro-Ricardian neutrality. In our calibrated model, however, we find these departures to be rather small. Two models are considered: EMU with one good; and a two-good EMU. We find that in the two-good EMU model, as relative prices can change, countries have an incentive to improve their terms of trade. This externality together with increased real interest rates - shared by all EMU countries - leads to an inefficient outcome in the non-cooperative case. Thus fiscal policy coordination can lead to significant welfare gains. With government spending externalities, however, the negative externalities can offset positive ones arising from government spending, such as defence. Furthermore, in the one-good EMU model, cooperation can be counterproductive. We conclude that the case for fiscal policy coordination depends upon the nature of both the economic integration in Europe and the externalities from government spending. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics
|
| 关键词 | Barro-ricardian neutrality
Emu
Externality
Fiscal policy coordination
Reputation
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp639
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529810
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Paul Levine,Andrew Brociner. DP639 Fiscal Policy Coordination and EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach. 1992.
|
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