| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP655 |
| DP655 Market Socialism and the Managerial Labour Market | |
| Gerard Roland; Khalid Sekkat | |
| 发表日期 | 1992-05-30 |
| 出版年 | 1992 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents a simple ratchet model. The ratchet effect, and the inability of the government to precommit credibly to given incentive schemes, are related to the fact that the government has monopsony power over managers, as is the case under market socialism where means of production are state-owned. But the introduction of a private sector of significant size gives an outside option to managers. Creating competition with the private sector is then a way to create credible commitment to public sector incentive schemes. Efficiency can be enhanced because of managers' interests in building a reputation on the managerial labour market, giving them the possibility of this outside option. |
| 关键词 | Managerial labour market Market socialism Ratchet effect |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp655 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529816 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gerard Roland,Khalid Sekkat. DP655 Market Socialism and the Managerial Labour Market. 1992. |
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