全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP685 Bargaining with a Composite Player: An Application to the Uruguay Round of GATT Negotiations

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP685
	DP685 Bargaining with a Composite Player: An Application to the Uruguay Round of GATT Negotiations
	Flavio Delbono; Giorgio Basevi; Marco Mariotti
发表日期	1992-07-30
出版年	1992
语种	英语
摘要	The paper analyses a situation in which negotiations take place between a party consisting of a single decision-maker and a party consisting of a group of two decision-makers. The latter, in setting its proposal to the opponent party, may act cooperatively or non-cooperatively within itself. The model seems to be applicable to many cases such as wage negotiations with a group of different workers' unions, disarmament negotiations with a group of allied countries, etc. In the paper, however, the model is directly applied to the case of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. In this case the authors' conjecture is that much of the difficulty currently experienced in reaching an agreement stems from the often non-cooperative nature of the preliminary agreement within the European Community required before it can arrive at a definite proposal for negotiation with other countries.
主题	International Trade and Regional Economics
关键词	Bargaining Gatt negotiations
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp685
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529848
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Flavio Delbono,Giorgio Basevi,Marco Mariotti. DP685 Bargaining with a Composite Player: An Application to the Uruguay Round of GATT Negotiations. 1992.