G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP701
DP701 Fiscal and Monetary Policy Under EMU: Credible Inflation Targets or Unpleasant Monetary Arithmetic?
Paul Levine; Joseph Pearlman
发表日期1992-08-18
出版年1992
语种英语
摘要The paper emphasizes the distinction between the purely fiscal reasons for fiscal policy coordination under EMU (given a credible low-inflation policy by the ECB), and the spillover effects of an uncoordinated fiscal policy on monetary policy. The worst scenario is where an independent ECB sets the common interest rate and responds to a rising government debt/GDP ratio in either of the two `countries' with a looser monetary stance. The result is high inflation, high debt/GDP ratios and a large public sector. In our intermediate scenario the ECB sets the nominal interest rate and the fiscal authorities bear sole responsibility for their own solvency. The result again, is an excessively large public sector, but government debt is contained and inflation is kept low. In these first two scenarios fiscal policy coordination (with an independent ECB) is counterproductive. The best scenario occurs with credible inflation targeting by the ECB. This removes the incentive for the fiscal authorities to cause surprise inflation. Welfare gains from fiscal coordination now exist but are only substantial in a two-good EMU.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Emu Fiscal policy coordination Monetary/ fiscal policy interdependence Reputation
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp701
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529854
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Paul Levine,Joseph Pearlman. DP701 Fiscal and Monetary Policy Under EMU: Credible Inflation Targets or Unpleasant Monetary Arithmetic?. 1992.
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