| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP702 |
| DP702 Monetary Policy and Reputational Equilibria: A Resolution of the Non-Uniqueness Problem | |
| Paul Levine; A Al-Nowaihi | |
| 发表日期 | 1992-08-18 |
| 出版年 | 1992 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper provides a resolution of the non-uniqueness of reputational equilibria in the Barro-Gordon monetary policy game. We introduce a `chisel-proof' credibility condition which ensures that in response to a small deviation from the low inflation rate by the central bank, it never pays for the private sector to acquiesce. This condition, which amounts to a refinement of the subgame perfect equilibrium, endogenizes the punishment length of the private sector's trigger strategy. The result is that a unique low-inflation outcome can be enforced as a sub-game perfect and credible non-cooperative equilibrium. A combination of discount factors close to unity for both players and short-wage contracts is the desirable combination to drive the best enforceable inflation outcome towards the ideal zero rate. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Credibility monetary policy Multiple equilibria Reputational equilibria |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp702 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529855 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paul Levine,A Al-Nowaihi. DP702 Monetary Policy and Reputational Equilibria: A Resolution of the Non-Uniqueness Problem. 1992. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Paul Levine]的文章 |
| [A Al-Nowaihi]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Paul Levine]的文章 |
| [A Al-Nowaihi]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Paul Levine]的文章 |
| [A Al-Nowaihi]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
