| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP728 |
| DP728 Federal Fiscal Constitutions. Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard | |
| Torsten Persson; Guido Tabellini | |
| 发表日期 | 1992-10-07 |
| 出版年 | 1992 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Inspired by current European developments, we study equilibrium fiscal policy under alternative constitutional arrangements in a `federation' of countries. There are two levels of government: local and federal. Local policy redistributes across individuals and affects the probability of aggregate shocks, while federal policy shares international risk. Policies are chosen under majority rule. There is a moral-hazard problem: federal risk-sharing can induce local governments to enact policies that increase local risk. We investigate this incentive problem under alternative fiscal constitutions. In particular, we contrast a `horizontally-ordered' federal system like the United States (in which the federal government deals directly with individuals) with a `vertically-ordered' system like the EC (in which the federal government deals with national states). These alternative arrangements are not neutral, in the sense that they create different incentives for policy-makers and voters, and give rise to different political equilibria. A general conclusion is that centralization of functions and power can be welfare improving under appropriate institutions. This conclusion only applies, however, to the moral-hazard problem and a federation where the countries are not too dissimilar. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Fiscal federalism Investment subsidies Politics Principal-agent models Risk sharing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp728 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529876 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Torsten Persson,Guido Tabellini. DP728 Federal Fiscal Constitutions. Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard. 1992. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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