| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP737 |
| DP737 The Advantage to Hiding One's Hand: Speculation and Central Bank Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market | |
| Paul Weller; Utpal Bhattacharya | |
| 发表日期 | 1992-11-30 |
| 出版年 | 1992 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using a portfolio balance model of exchange rate determination, this paper develops a theoretical explanation of why central banks do not make precise announcements of their exchange rate targets. In foreign exchange markets, where it is common knowledge that the central bank intervenes to stabilize the spot exchange rate around some target level, foreign exchange traders can exploit this fact to earn speculative profits from the central bank: this may cause the bank's reserves to fall to dangerous levels. We show that if the central bank is imprecise about its exchange rate targeting, it can use this informational advantage not only to reduce its reserve losses, but also to extract all relevant `fundamental' information from the traders. The imprecision, however, cannot be too large. There exist circumstances where the central bank finds it advantageous to reduce the market's ex ante uncertainty about the exchange rate target. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Central bank intervention Exchange rate target zones Speculation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp737 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529892 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paul Weller,Utpal Bhattacharya. DP737 The Advantage to Hiding One's Hand: Speculation and Central Bank Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market. 1992. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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