| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP752 |
| DP752 Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem | |
| Michele Fratianni; Jurgen von Hagen; Christopher Waller | |
| 发表日期 | 1993-01-31 |
| 出版年 | 1993 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An inflation and stabilization bias may arise as a result of the principal-agent nature of monetary policy. Both depend on the degree of political uncertainty and the type of relationship between central bankers and the incumbent political leaders. Specifically, our analysis indicates how a close relationship between central bankers and incumbent political leaders can lead to undesirable outcomes, particularly so during periods of electoral competition and political uncertainty. Various institutional proposals exist for resolving this problem. Our analysis shows that in contrast to Friedman-type policy rules or the appointment of `conservative' central bankers, personal independence of the central banker from government or performance-orientated compensation packages can achieve both optimal stabilization and the elimination of the inflation bias. |
| 主题 | Central Banking |
| 关键词 | Central banking monetary policy Political business cycles |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp752 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529906 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michele Fratianni,Jurgen von Hagen,Christopher Waller. DP752 Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem. 1993. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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