| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP761 |
| DP761 Delegation in International Monetary Policy Games | |
| Jorge Padilla; Juan Dolado; Mark Griffiths | |
| 发表日期 | 1993-02-28 |
| 出版年 | 1993 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we show that the delegation of monetary policy to an independent and more conservative central banker is an optimal policy in an international context with monetary spillovers between countries, even in the absence of time inconsistency (credibility) issues. We also study the welfare implications of delegating monetary policy and extend our analysis to incorporate the coordination of monetary policies. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Delegation International economy monetary policy Spillovers |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp761 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529917 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jorge Padilla,Juan Dolado,Mark Griffiths. DP761 Delegation in International Monetary Policy Games. 1993. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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