| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP774 |
| DP774 The Political Economy of the Exchange Rate Mechanism | |
| Patrick Minford | |
| 发表日期 | 1993-03-31 |
| 出版年 | 1993 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Since the establishment in 1979 of the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS a number of countries, after entry, have experienced a substantial and persistent rise in their real exchange rate (the ratio of domestic to foreign prices). This paper explains this phenomenon in terms of a `peso problem' of credibility created by the response of a member government to the incentives it faces within the ERM.A country within the ERM that attempts to restrain inflation and avoid economic distortions faces strong pressure from its domestic manufacturing lobby. In the event that trading conditions for manufacturers worsen drastically, they will apply intense pressure not only for subsidy protection but also for a devaluation. When times are good, however, the pressure will be relaxed. This creates an asymmetry in the government's policy reaction: devaluation and subsidy in bad times, and no parity change or subsidy in good times. The result is an average expectation of devaluation in excess of what normally occurs which leads to overvaluation in normal times. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Emu Exchange rate overvaluation Micro foundations Optimal currency area Peso problem Real exchange rate |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp774 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529925 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick Minford. DP774 The Political Economy of the Exchange Rate Mechanism. 1993. |
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