| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP827 |
| DP827 Protection for Sale | |
| Elhanan Helpman; Gene Grossman | |
| 发表日期 | 1993-06-30 |
| 出版年 | 1993 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model in which special interest groups make political contributions in order to influence an incumbent government's choice of trade policy. In the political equilibrium, the interest groups bid for protection, and each group's offer is optimal given the offers of the others. The politicians maximize their own welfare, which depends on the total amount of contributions collected and on the aggregate welfare of voters. We study the structure of protection that emerges in political equilibrium and the equilibrium contributions that are made by the different industry lobby groups, and show why these groups may in some cases prefer to have the government use trade policy to transfer income rather than more efficient means. We also discuss how our framework might be extended to include endogenous formation of lobby groups, political competition between incumbents and challengers, and political outcomes in a multicountry trading system. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Political economy Political support Special interests Structure of protection Tariff formation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp827 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529950 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Elhanan Helpman,Gene Grossman. DP827 Protection for Sale. 1993. |
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