G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP793
DP793 The Political Economy of Capital Controls
Alberto Alesina; Vittorio Grilli
发表日期1993-07-31
出版年1993
语种英语
摘要This paper studies the institutional and political determinants of capital controls in a sample of 20 OECD countries for the period 195089. One of the most interesting results is that capital controls are more likely to be imposed by strong governments, which have a relatively `free' hand over monetary policy, because the Central Bank is not very independent. By imposing capital controls these governments raise more seigniorage revenue and keep interest rates artificially low. As a result, public debt accumulates at a slower rate than otherwise. This suggests that an institutional reform which makes the Central Bank more independent makes it more difficult for the government to finance its budget. The tightening of the fiscal constraint may force the government to adjust towards a more `sound' fiscal policy. We also find that, as expected, and in accordance with the theory, capital controls are more likely to be introduced when the exchange rate is pegged or managed. We found no effects of capital controls on growth, however, and reject rather strongly the hypothesis that capital controls reduce growth.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Capital controls Political economy Seigniorage
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp793
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529956
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alberto Alesina,Vittorio Grilli. DP793 The Political Economy of Capital Controls. 1993.
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