| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP807 |
| DP807 Provision of Public Inputs and the Effects of Successful Lobbying in Open Economies | |
| Michael Rauscher | |
| 发表日期 | 1993-07-31 |
| 出版年 | 1993 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Lobbying activities bias the political decision-making process. There tend to be deviations from the socially-optimal solutions. This paper shows that in an international context, this bias is not necessarily harmful in terms of economic welfare. It may correct externalities that occur in an international policy game when individual governments behave strategically. The strategic variable in this model is the quantity of a factor of production which is provided by the government, e.g. an infrastructure good. If both countries under consideration are large and wish to affect the remuneration of the internationally mobile factor of production, it can be seen that one country provides too much of the public input whereas the other country does not provide enough. Lobbying activities that tend to increase the supply of this input in the latter country may, therefore, lead to welfare gains for both countries involved in the jurisdictional competition, provided that the source cost of lobbying is not to high. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | International capital movements Lobbies Public provision of inputs |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp807 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/529963 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Rauscher. DP807 Provision of Public Inputs and the Effects of Successful Lobbying in Open Economies. 1993. |
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