| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP857 |
| DP857 A Domino Theory of Regionalism | |
| Richard Baldwin | |
| 发表日期 | 1993-11-30 |
| 出版年 | 1993 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The degree of collusiveness of a market with consumer switching costs is studied in an infinite-horizon overlapping-generations model of duopolistic competition. In contrast to previous models of switching costs, this paper assumes that firms compete for the demand for a homogeneous good by setting prices simultaneously in each period. It characterizes the unique symmetric stationary Markovian perfect equilibrium of this game and shows that the existence of switching costs unambiguously relaxes price competition in equilibrium. It also shows that, on the contrary, tacit collusion is more difficult to sustain in a market with consumer switching costs since the severity of the optimal punishments is reduced. |
| 关键词 | Dynamic programming Entry deterrence Markov perfect equilibrium Optimal punishments Switching costs Tacit collusion |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp857 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530003 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Richard Baldwin. DP857 A Domino Theory of Regionalism. 1993. |
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