| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP891 |
| DP891 Large Shareholders, Private Benefits of Control and Optimal Schemes for Privatization | |
| Francesca Cornelli; David Daokui Li | |
| 发表日期 | 1994-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 1994 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper argues that further moves to liberalize trade and to implement existing GATT disciplines may have a greater impact on global competition than the pursuit of harmonized multilateral competition policy disciplines. It also suggests that current GATT rules and case law provide scope for both the application and non-application of existing domestic competition laws of contracting parties to be challenged in those instances where this leads to de facto discrimination between domestic and foreign products. Little use has been made of the GATT in this connection, suggesting that exploration of existing indirect avenues to raise competition-related disputes in GATT be pursued more actively. This would help to identify what specific government policies might be the subject of multilateral negotiations and explicit incorporation into the GATT framework. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Competition policy Gatt Multilateral trade negotiations |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp891 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530040 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francesca Cornelli,David Daokui Li. DP891 Large Shareholders, Private Benefits of Control and Optimal Schemes for Privatization. 1994. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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