| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP941 |
| DP941 Monetary Policy with Flexible Exchange Rates and Forward Interest Rates as Indicators | |
| Lars E.O. Svensson | |
| 发表日期 | 1994-04-30 |
| 出版年 | 1994 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: a public auction or an optimally structured negotiation with a smaller number of bidders? We show that under standard assumptions the public auction is always preferable, even if it forfeits all the seller's negotiating power, including the ability to withdraw the object from sale, provided only that it attracts at least one extra bidder. An immediate public auction also dominates negotiating while maintaining the right to hold an auction subsequently with more bidders. The results hold for both the standard independent private values model and a common values model. They suggest that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition. |
| 关键词 | Asset sales Auctions Mergers and acquisitions Negotiations |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp941 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530082 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lars E.O. Svensson. DP941 Monetary Policy with Flexible Exchange Rates and Forward Interest Rates as Indicators. 1994. |
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