| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP943
|
| DP943 The Role of Political Constraints in Transition Strategies |
| Gerard Roland
|
| 发表日期 | 1994-04-30
|
| 出版年 | 1994
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | In this paper we specify and estimate a structural model of competition for the European airline industry to assess the potential for price reductions if competition increases. The model has two distinguishing features: First, we allow for firms to make short- and long-run decisions by explicitly estimating a structural, two-stage game. In that sense, our model allows for dynamics that do not rely on the switching regime literature. Unlike some of the other contributions in the literature, we also explicitly estimate the entire structural model, that is demand, cost (short and long run), and conduct. Second, our paper distinguishes between domestic market niches and competition at the international level, by specifying a product-differentiated game in the second stage. This distinction carries important policy implications. In general we find that relatively little market power is due to price collusion. In fact, firms compete significantly more than a standard Nash game would suggest. On the other hand, significant monopoly power is identified in domestic markets. Given that prices are not high because of cartel pricing, airline prices in Europe might come down more gradually as efficiency increases and market niches are abolished. |
| 关键词 | Airline industry
Efficiency
Structural model
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp943
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530084
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Gerard Roland. DP943 The Role of Political Constraints in Transition Strategies. 1994.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
