| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1027 |
| DP1027 A Dynamic Model of Collusion | |
| Daron Acemoğlu | |
| 发表日期 | 1994-09-30 |
| 出版年 | 1994 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines the implications for strategic trade policy of different assumptions about precommitment. In a dynamic oligopoly game with learning by doing, the optimal first-period subsidy is lower if firms cannot precommit to future output than if they can; and is lower still if the government cannot precommit to future subsidies. In the linear case the optimal subsidy is increasing in the rate of learning with precommitment, but decreasing in it if the government cannot precommit. The infant-industry argument is thus reversed in the absence of precommitment, which has important implications for economic policy in dynamic environments. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Infant-industry protection Learning by doing Precommitment Strategic trade policy Time consistency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1027 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530167 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daron Acemoğlu. DP1027 A Dynamic Model of Collusion. 1994. |
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