| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1042 |
| DP1042 Testing Long-run Neutrality: Empirical Evidence for G7 Countries with Special Emphasis on Germany | |
| Axel A. Weber | |
| 发表日期 | 1994-10-31 |
| 出版年 | 1994 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine national effects on the common policies of the European Union (EU). The paper establishes a difference between national influence on voting outcomes and policies. It is assumed that policies of the EU are public goods and Holler's public good power index is applied. The method is extended to cover voting games with coalitions to reveal also the effects of cooperation on policies. We show that small countries have more influence on common policies of the EU than on voting outcomes. Coalition formation can, however, ruin this since even coalitions smaller than the blocking minority can control policy. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Cooperative game theory European union Voting power |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1042 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530182 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Axel A. Weber. DP1042 Testing Long-run Neutrality: Empirical Evidence for G7 Countries with Special Emphasis on Germany. 1994. |
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