G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP1077
DP1077 Auctions of Shares with a Secondary Market and Tender Offers
Antonio S. Mello; John E. Parsons
发表日期1994-12-31
出版年1994
语种英语
摘要This paper derives a model in which workers have firm-specific and industry-specific skills, and in each period there is a non-zero probability that a worker quits. This makes the private discount factor, used by firms in making decisions about hiring and training new workers and firing existing ones, higher than the social one. As a consequence, not only do firms underinvest in training but employment becomes too cyclical. Firms are too quick to dispose of their human capital in a cyclical downturn because it is of less value to them than it is to society. This provides a rationale for state-mandated redundancy payments as a second-best remedy to overcome the market failure.
关键词Employment cyclicality Human capital Quitting externalities Redundancy payments
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp1077
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530222
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Antonio S. Mello,John E. Parsons. DP1077 Auctions of Shares with a Secondary Market and Tender Offers. 1994.
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