| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1077 |
| DP1077 Auctions of Shares with a Secondary Market and Tender Offers | |
| Antonio S. Mello; John E. Parsons | |
| 发表日期 | 1994-12-31 |
| 出版年 | 1994 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper derives a model in which workers have firm-specific and industry-specific skills, and in each period there is a non-zero probability that a worker quits. This makes the private discount factor, used by firms in making decisions about hiring and training new workers and firing existing ones, higher than the social one. As a consequence, not only do firms underinvest in training but employment becomes too cyclical. Firms are too quick to dispose of their human capital in a cyclical downturn because it is of less value to them than it is to society. This provides a rationale for state-mandated redundancy payments as a second-best remedy to overcome the market failure. |
| 关键词 | Employment cyclicality Human capital Quitting externalities Redundancy payments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1077 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530222 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Antonio S. Mello,John E. Parsons. DP1077 Auctions of Shares with a Secondary Market and Tender Offers. 1994. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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