| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1085 |
| DP1085 Regional Labour Market Dynamics in Europe | |
| Antonio Fatas; Jörg Decressin | |
| 发表日期 | 1994-12-31 |
| 出版年 | 1994 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We construct a locational model of majority voting when competing parties offer special favours to interest groups. Each group's membership is heterogeneous in its affinities for the two parties. Individuals face a trade-off between party affinity and their own transfer receipts.The model is sufficiently general to yield two often-discussed but competing theories as special cases. If the parties are equally effective in delivering transfers to any group, the outcome of the process conforms to the `swing voter' theory: both parties woo the politically-central groups most responsive to economic favours. If groups have party affiliations and each party is more effective in delivering favours to its own support group, we can get the `machine politics' outcome, where each party dispenses favour to its core support group. But in some circumstances the machine may find it advantageous to tax its core and use the proceeds to win the support of other voters. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Interest group Machine politics Restribution Swing voters |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1085 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530229 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Antonio Fatas,Jörg Decressin. DP1085 Regional Labour Market Dynamics in Europe. 1994. |
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