| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP1101
|
| DP1101 Quitting Externalities, Employment Cyclicality and Firing Costs |
| Alison Booth; Gylfi Zoega
|
| 发表日期 | 1994-12-31
|
| 出版年 | 1994
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Intra-day interest rates are zero. Consequently, a foreign exchange dealer can short a vulnerable currency in the morning, close this position in the afternoon, and never face an interest cost. This tactic might seem especially attractive in times of crisis, since it suggests an immunity to the central bank's interest rate defence. In equilibrium, however, buyers of the vulnerable currency must be compensated on average with an intra-day capital gain, as long as no devaluation occurs. That is, currencies under attack should typically appreciate intra-day. Using data on intra-day exchange rate changes within the European Monetary System, we find this prediction is borne out. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics
|
| 关键词 | Crises
Defence
Foreign exchange
Interest rate
Returns
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1101
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530234
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Alison Booth,Gylfi Zoega. DP1101 Quitting Externalities, Employment Cyclicality and Firing Costs. 1994.
|
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