| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP1088 |
| DP1088 Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from US States | |
| Morris Goldstein; Geoffrey Woglom; Tamim Bayoumi | |
| 发表日期 | 1995-01-31 |
| 出版年 | 1995 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When two countries, starting from different quality levels reflecting different conditions of domestic market demand, open to trade, two possible equilibria arise. In the first, the quality leader maintains its position. In the second, leapfrogging occurs. The latter is possible only if the initial quality gap is not too wide, however. Further, when the risk dominance criterion is used, only the former equilibrium is selected. This result holds for both segmented and integrated markets. Qualities, profits and world welfare are higher when firms can price discriminate (i.e. under segmented markets). |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Country asymmetries integrated markets Equilibrium selection International trade Product differentiation Segmented markets |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp1088 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530237 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Morris Goldstein,Geoffrey Woglom,Tamim Bayoumi. DP1088 Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from US States. 1995. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
