G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP1107
DP1107 Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives
John Vickers; Margaret Meyer
发表日期1995-01-31
出版年1995
语种英语
摘要We study in this paper whether the price charged to a competitor for the use of an essential input produced in conditions of natural monopoly should reflect only considerations of relative efficiency between the various potential suppliers. In a model that captures the technological conditions operating in industries such as telephony, gas, rail, where access to a distribution network is essential to the ability to compete, we show that this is not the case. Instead, the access price should be set `pro-competitively': it may be socially optimal to award production to a firm less efficient than the owner of the network.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Access Competition in regulated markets Network Regulation
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp1107
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/530250
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
John Vickers,Margaret Meyer. DP1107 Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives. 1995.
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